Murr-ky Waters: How Murr v. Wisconsin Creates Uncertainty in Attempting to Answer the “Denominator Question” by Kassir, Charles M.
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law
Endnotes
5-5-2018
Murr-ky Waters: How Murr v. Wisconsin Creates
Uncertainty in Attempting to Answer the
“Denominator Question”
Charles M. Kassir
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/endnotes
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons
This Articles from Volume 77 is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Endnotes by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
77 Md. L. Rev. Endnotes 73 (2018)
  
73 
Note 
MURR-KY WATERS: HOW MURR V. WISCONSIN CREATES 
UNCERTAINTY IN ATTEMPTING TO ANSWER THE 
“DENOMINATOR QUESTION” 
CHARLES M. KASSIR 
In Murr v. Wisconsin,1 the Supreme Court of the United States created 
a three-factor test for determining when two contiguous properties should 
be treated as one for the purpose of regulatory takings analyses: whether 
state and local law treat the land as merged; whether the physical character-
istics of the land support merger; and whether merger unreasonably impacts 
the prospective value of the regulated land.2  After applying the new factors 
to the two contiguous properties at issue, the Supreme Court held that the 
land should be analyzed as one property.3  The Court had the opportunity to 
solve the denominator problem—how a court should determine the value 
remaining in a property compared to the value taken4—but failed to clarify 
the few categorical rules already available under the takings doctrine.5  Fur-
ther, the Court’s new test gives too much deference to states by providing 
for consideration of state interests (at least) twice.6  Finally, the Court creat-
ed confusion by introducing narrow factors that ultimately will be meaning-
less in most takings inquiries, yet may mislead litigants to embark on an un-
successful litigation strategy.7  Ultimately, Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent 
was more persuasive than the majority opinion because it provided a 
straightforward solution to the denominator problem—use of state lines to 
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 1.  137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). 
 2.  Id. at 1945–46. 
 3.  Id. at 1948; see infra notes 96–107 and accompanying text. 
 4.  See infra Part II.C. 
 5.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 6.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 7.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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identify what property is subject to a takings analysis.8  While the outcome 
for the Murrs was likely correct under modern jurisprudence, the Court fell 
short of clarifying the denominator problem and missed an opportunity to 
demystify a portion of the muddled regulatory takings doctrine.9 
I.  THE CASE 
The Murr siblings own two contiguous parcels, Lots E and F, which 
were purchased by their parents in 1963 and 1960 respectively.10  The 
Murrs’ parents built a cabin on Lot F, but Lot E has remained vacant since 
its purchase.11  Topographically, the roughly one-and-one-quarter-acre lots 
are very similar: they are located on the St. Croix River, each bisected by a 
steep, 130-foot bluff.12  The lots have approximately .98 acres of “net pro-
ject area”13 between them.14  The lots came under common ownership when 
the Murrs’ parents transferred them to the Murr siblings in 1994 and 1995,15 
resulting in merger of the lots under a local ordinance.16 
The ordinance has been in place since the mid-1970s and prohibits the 
sale or development “of adjacent, substandard lots under common owner-
ship.”17  However, if commonly owned, contiguous lots do not contain the 
required net project area—one acre—“they may together suffice as a single, 
buildable lot.”18 
Years later, the Murrs sought a variance to move the cabin on Lot F 
and sell Lot E as a separate lot, but the St. Croix County Board of Adjust-
ment denied the application.19  The Wisconsin Circuit Court and Wisconsin 
                                                          
 8.  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see infra notes 116–133 and accom-
panying text. 
 9.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 10.  Murr v. St. Croix Cty. Bd. of Adjustment (Murr I), 796 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2011). 
 11.  Id.  The Murrs’ parents owned title in Lot E but transferred title of Lot F to their plumb-
ing company.  Id.  This explains why the lots were not technically under common ownership until 
they were transferred to the Murr siblings.  See id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  “‘Net project area’ means developable land area minus slope preservation zones, flood-
plains, road rights-of-way and wetlands.” WIS. ADMIN. CODE NR § 118.03(27) (2017). 
 14.  Murr I, 796 N.W.2d at 841. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Murr v. State (Murr II), No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 
23, 2014); see ST. CROIX COUNTY, WIS., CODE OF ORDINANCES, LAND USE & DEVELOPMENT, 
§ 17.36(I)(4)(a) (2005) (amended 2007 & 2014) [hereinafter ST. CROIX ORDINANCES]. 
 17.  Murr II, 2014 WL 7271581, at *1 (citing ST. CROIX ORDINANCES § 17.36(I)(4)(a)–(b)); 
see ST. CROIX ORDINANCES § 17.36(I)(4)(a).  
 18.  Murr II, 2014 WL 7271581, at *1 (citing Murr I, 796 N.W.2d at 843 n.9); see ST. CROIX 
ORDINANCES § 17.36(I)(4)(a). 
 19.  Murr I, 796 N.W.2d at 841. 
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Court of Appeals affirmed the Board’s decision.20  Subsequently, the Murrs 
filed a complaint alleging that the merger ordinance resulted in an uncom-
pensated taking of their property in which they were deprived of “all, or 
practically all, of the use of Lot E because the lot cannot be sold or devel-
oped as a separate lot.”21  The Murrs asserted that the size, location, and ter-
rain of Lot E limited its use to a single-family residence.22  The Wisconsin 
Circuit Court determined “the applicable law required it to analyze the ef-
fect of the Ordinance on the Murrs’ property as a whole, not each lot indi-
vidually.”23  Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment to the State, 
holding that the property, taken as a whole, could be used for varying pur-
poses.24  Notably, a residence could be built “entirely on Lot E, entirely on 
Lot F, or could straddle both lots.”25  The Murrs’ appealed the decision.26 
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court’s ruling.27  
The court decided that the takings analysis “properly focused” on the ordi-
nance’s effect on the property as a whole.28  The Court of Appeals added 
that the Murrs were “charged with knowledge of the existing zoning laws” 
when they acquired the lots, thus, their expectation that the lots be treated 
separately was unreasonable.29  The Supreme Court of Wisconsin denied 
review,30 but the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to 
determine “the proper unit of property against which to assess the effect of 
[a] challenged [taking].”31 
                                                          
 20.  Id. at 840, 841, 845 (holding that the request to relocate the cabin was “simply a matter of 
convenience” and that “[p]ersonal inconvenience alone does not constitute the unnecessary hard-
ship required to grant variances” (citing Snyder v Waukesha Cty. Zoning Bd., 247 N.W.2d 98 
(1976))). 
 21.  Murr II, 2014 WL 7271581, at *2. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id.  The Wisconsin Circuit Court initially found that the Murrs’ claim was time barred, 
but despite this conclusion, the court reached the merits of the claim.  Id.  The court also noted 
“the merger decreased the [Murrs’] property value by less than ten percent,” thus retaining eco-
nomic significance.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. at *8. 
 28.  Id. at *5.  The Wisconsin Court of Appeals relied on United States Supreme Court juris-
prudence, stating that the Court has “never endorsed a test that ‘segments’ a contiguous property 
to determine the relevant parcel.”  Id. at *4 (quoting Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528, 
532 (Wis. 1996)). 
 29.  Id. at *8 (citing State ex rel. The Markdale Corp. v Bd. of Appeals of Milwaukee, 133 
N.W.2d 795, 798 (Wis. 1965)). 
 30.  Murr v. State, 862 N.W.2d 899 (Wis. 2015). 
 31.  Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1943 (2017). 
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II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, private 
property shall not “be taken for public use, without just compensation.”32  
The regulatory takings doctrine has its genesis in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon,33 which recognized that, although it is widely accepted that gov-
ernment may regulate property, when a “regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”34  However, the Mahon Court did not provide any 
expanded guidance as to when a regulation crosses the threshold from a 
permissible rule to an unconstitutional taking.35  In general, Supreme Court 
jurisprudence in the century following Mahon included only ad hoc inquir-
ies as to what was a regulatory taking, but generally did not delineate defin-
itive rules.36  Part II.A discusses what are arguably the only categorical 
rules developed by the Court—those found in Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp.37 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.38  
Part II.B discusses Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City,39 
where the Court set out complex factors to guide courts through takings in-
quiries.40  Finally, Part II.C discusses modern takings objectives and the 
genesis of the denominator problem.41 
A.  Lucas and Loretto: The Categorical Rules for Physical Intrusion 
and Complete Loss of Economic Benefit 
The Supreme Court has refused to adopt a strict rule for resolving reg-
ulatory takings inquiries.  However, the Court has recognized two “categor-
ical” regulatory takings that are compensable under the Takings Clause 
without a case-specific inquiry.42  First, regulations that force a property 
owner to suffer a permanent physical intrusion, no matter how small, re-
quire compensation.43  In Loretto, the Court held a New York law that re-
quired landlords to allow cable companies to affix cable boxes to the land-
                                                          
 32.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 33.  260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 34.  Id. at 415. 
 35.  See id (describing that a regulation can go too far, but not clarifying how to determine 
when the regulation goes too far). 
 36.  See infra Part II.A–B. 
 37.  458 U.S. 419 (1982); see infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text. 
 38.  505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see infra notes 45–50 and accompanying text. 
 39.  438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 40.  See infra Part II.B; notes 51–64 and accompanying text. 
 41.  See infra Part II.C. 
 42.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
 43.  Id. 
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lords’ buildings constituted a compensable taking even though the boxes 
occupied less than two cubic feet of space.44 
Second, regulations that “den[y] all economically beneficial or produc-
tive use of land” require compensation.45  In Lucas, the Court determined 
that a South Carolina regulation that barred the property owner from devel-
oping any permanently habitable structures rendered the land valueless and 
required compensation.46  However, the Court limited this category of eco-
nomic takings, noting that complete deprivation will not require compensa-
tion if the regulation merely duplicates the result of state property or nui-
sance laws, or if the regulation inheres in the power of the state to abate 
public nuisances.47  In other words, if a government can prohibit one from 
building on their property by calling such building a public nuisance, then 
compensation is not required.48  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, recog-
nized the inherent issue with this “categorical” rule: “the rhetorical force of 
our ‘deprivation of all economically feasible use’ rule . . . does not make 
clear the ‘property interest’ against which the loss of value is to be meas-
ured.”49  Here, the Court set the table for the denominator problem, dis-
cussed below in Part II.C, but did not resolve the issue.50 
B.  Penn Central’s Ad Hoc Inquiry Factors and the “Parcel as a 
Whole” 
Even if a regulation does not generate a physical intrusion or com-
pletely deprive economic benefit, a regulatory taking may be found based 
on the following factors: (1) “the economic impact of the regulation;” (2) 
“the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations;” and (3) “the character of the governmental action.”51  
The analytical result of these factors necessarily depends on how the prop-
                                                          
 44.  Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435–40 (1982).  The 
Court remanded the case to the state court to determine the amount of compensation.  Id. at 441. 
 45.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015. 
 46.  Id. at 1019–22, 1032. 
 47.  Id. at 1029.  The court enumerated factors for the determination of whether a regulation 
duplicates the effect of other state laws stating:  
[T]he degree of harm to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property, posed 
by the claimant’s proposed activities, the social value of the claimant’s activities and 
their suitability to the locality in question, and the relative ease with which the alleged 
harm can be avoided through measures taken by the claimant and the government (or 
adjacent private landowners) alike. 
Id. at 1030–31 (citations omitted). 
 48.  See id. at 1029 (describing the public nuisance exception to the Lucas rule). 
 49.  Id. at 1015, 1016 n.7. 
 50.  See id. (identifying the denominator problem but avoiding how to solve it); infra Part 
II.C. 
 51.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (citing Goldblatt v. 
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)). 
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erty is defined52—if only part of the property is impacted, is that the rele-
vant portion?  Or is the whole property the relevant portion?  The Court an-
swered that question in Penn Central, where a real estate developer sought 
to establish a taking when a New York landmark preservation law prevent-
ed the developer from building an office building on top of Grand Central 
Terminal.53  The developer argued that the regulation deprived them of any 
gainful use of their “air rights” because they were unable to build vertical-
ly.54  Thus, the developer insisted that, irrespective of the value remaining 
in the parcel, the city had taken their “right to this superadjacent airspace.”55  
Instead of dividing the single parcel into discrete segments—so that the 
parcel’s air rights were distinct from the parcel’s land rights—and attempt-
ing to determine whether the regulation abrogated a particular segment, the 
Court determined that it must focus on the “parcel as a whole.”56  Then, us-
ing the three factors listed above, the Penn Central Court determined that 
the developer could not establish a taking simply because they were unable 
to exploit an airspace property interest.57  The Court did not expand on how 
to determine what constitutes a “parcel as a whole.”58 
The Court applied the “parcel as a whole” test in Tahoe-Sierra Preser-
vation Council Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,59 where the peti-
tioners had purchased land overlooking Lake Tahoe to develop as vaca-
tion/retirement homes.60  The Court held that the regulation, which 
prevented development for a temporary period of time, was not a per se tak-
ing because the moratorium was only temporary, and thus, residual value 
remained in the land.61  Thus, the Court determined that it was proper to 
consider the parcel as a whole, meaning that the petitioners’ temporary in-
terest would not be separated from their residual interest.62  The Court made 
clear that the “parcel as a whole” test focuses on the division of property in-
                                                          
 52.  See id. at 130–31 (“‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete 
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abro-
gated. . . . [T]his Court focuses rather on the . . . parcel as a whole . . . .”). 
 53.  Id. at 115–22. 
 54.  Id. at 130. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. at 130–31. 
 57.  Id. at 130.  In this case, the Court determined that the “parcel as a whole” had not been 
completely abrogated.  Id. at 130–31. 
 58.  See id. at 130–31 (failing to expand upon what constitutes a “parcel as a whole”). 
 59.  535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
 60.  Id. at 312–13. 
 61.  Id. at 332 (“Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be rendered valueless by a temporary 
prohibition on economic use, because the property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is 
lifted.”). 
 62.  Id. at 319–20. 
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terests and not the physical division of parcels of land.63  However, what 
constitutes a “parcel as a whole” has yet to be determined.64 
C.  Modern Takings Objectives and the Denominator Problem 
Even with the Lucas, Loretto, and Penn Central guidelines in place, 
the central dynamic of regulatory takings jurisprudence is its flexibility.  
Since Mahon, flexible, case-by-case inquiries have attempted to square two 
competing objectives: (1) the individual’s right to retain interest in private 
property,65 and (2) the government’s power to adjust rights for the public 
good.66  No matter the case, the Court has balanced these interests based on 
the specific facts of each dispute.67 
The flexibility of the takings analysis presents at least one major flaw: 
because it requires a court to compare the value taken from property (the 
numerator) with the value remaining in property (the denominator); it begs 
the question, “[W]hose value is to furnish the denominator of the frac-
tion[?]”68  In Lucas, Justice Blackmun pointed out that the issue is neces-
sarily subjective because “whether the owner has been deprived of all eco-
nomic value of his property will depend on how ‘property’ is defined.”69  
Justice Blackmun continued: 
 We have long understood that any land-use regulation can be 
characterized as the ‘total’ deprivation of an aptly defined enti-
tlement. . . .  Alternatively, the same regulation can always be 
characterized as a mere ‘partial’ withdrawal from full, unencum-
                                                          
 63.  See id. at 331 (“[D]efining the property interest taken in terms of the very regulation be-
ing challenged is circular.  With property so divided, every delay would become a total ban; the 
moratorium and the normal permit process alike would constitute categorical takings.”). 
 64.  See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978). 
 65.  See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617–18 (2001); Armstrong v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (discussing the public’s right to freedom from governmental force 
in the takings context). 
 66.  See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (“The Takings Clause . . . preserves 
governmental power to regulate . . . .” (first quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; then citing 
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962))). 
 67.  See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617–18 (“These inquiries are informed by the purpose of the 
Takings Clause, which is to prevent the government from ‘forcing some people alone to bear pub-
lic burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.’” (quoting 
Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49)). 
 68.  Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (quoting 
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of 
“Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1192 (1967)).  Justice Brandeis hinted to this 
problem nearly a century ago in Mahon.  Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 69.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1054 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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bered ownership of the landholding affected by the regula-
tion . . . .70 
Ultimately, the federal courts have never solved the denominator problem 
and have been inconsistent on the issue.71 
The Supreme Court, despite deciding many important takings cases 
since Lucas, has rarely touched the denominator issue.72  Instead, the Court 
has only tangentially addressed the denominator problem in three kinds of 
severance cases: vertical severance,73 temporal severance,74 and functional 
severance75—all approaches in contrast to the “parcel as a whole” analysis 
from Penn Central.  The Court has left room to address the denominator 
problem in a horizontal severance case. 
                                                          
 70.  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Frank I. Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1600, 1614 (1988)). 
 71.  Compare, e.g., Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 100, 108 (2002) (holding 
that the denominator to be considered was the parcel as a whole), and Deltona Corp. v. United 
States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192–93 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (refusing to horizontally sever a property, and thus, 
find a taking where two-thirds of a property was rendered valueless), with Loveladies Harbor, Inc. 
v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1181–82 (Fed Cir. 1994) (holding that compensation was required 
where the regulation destroyed the entire value of one discrete portion of a large parcel), and Fla. 
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (finding a compensable 
taking where value of the land was reduced by about sixty percent). 
State law has shed some light on the problem, but determinations are far from conclusive.  
New York courts adhere to the “parcel as a whole” rule from Penn Central.  See Putnam Cty. 
Nat’l Bank v. City of New York, 829 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662–63 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (finding that 
no taking had occurred where a developer was only granted a permit for a 17-lot subdivision as 
opposed to a 36-lot subdivision because an economic benefit was still present).  Colorado courts 
have come to similar conclusions.  See Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. 
Comm’rs, 38 P.3d 59, 61 (Colo. 2001) (“[I]t is inappropriate to limit a takings inquiry solely to 
one particular right in the land, or, to a particular part of the land.”). 
 72.  See, e.g., supra Part II.A–B. 
 73.  Vertical severance addresses the interplay between subsurface, surface, and air rights.  
See the discussion of Penn Central, supra Part II.B, regarding the severability of air rights.  Since 
Penn Central, the Court has been sufficiently clear that vertical severance is impermissible.  See 
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 506, where the Court upheld a statute that combined underground interests 
and surface interests, thus reinforcing the absence of vertical severability. 
 74.  Temporary takings that deny a landowner all use of their property require compensation.  
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 318 (1987).  
In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church, the Court determined that compensation was due 
for the portion of time during which all use of the property was taken, even if use of the property 
returned to the owner.  Id. at 321–22.  Thus, the Court severed the property into two segments 
along a timeline: one when the regulation was in effect, and one after it was struck down.  See id. 
 75.  The Court has twice found a taking where a municipality refused to grant a building per-
mit unless the property owner granted an easement to the municipality.  See Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).  In these cas-
es, the Court equated easements with permanent, physical occupations of a discrete portion of 
land—functionally severing that portion from the rest.  Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831; Dolan, 512 U.S. 
at 393–94. 
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III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Murr v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court held that the Wisconsin 
Court of Appeals was correct to analyze the Murrs’ property as a single 
unit.76  The test for regulatory takings analysis requires a court to “compare 
the value that has been taken from the property with the value that remains 
in the property,”77 thus the critical question is how to define the unit of 
property.78  In Murr, the Court attempted to clarify this question by intro-
ducing new factors to consider when determining the proper denominator of 
a takings inquiry: “the treatment of the land under state and local law; the 
physical characteristics of the land; and the prospective value of the regu-
lated land.”79  Under these factors, the Court held that the Murrs’ property 
should be analyzed as one parcel, and it followed, under prior takings juris-
prudence, that the Murrs had not established a compensable taking.80 
The Court first highlighted the legal background of the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Takings Clause, which states that private property shall not “be tak-
en for public use, without just compensation.”81  Writing for the Court, Jus-
tice Kennedy emphasized the flexibility of the Court’s regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, and the essential balance of the doctrine’s central, competing 
objectives: (1) the individual’s right to retain the interests and freedoms of 
use attached to private property ownership, and (2) the government’s power 
to adjust rights in the public’s best interest.82 
Next, the Court discussed two guidelines that help identify the relevant 
parcel for a regulatory takings inquiry.83  First, the Court has declined to ar-
tificially limit the parcel in question to the portion “targeted by the chal-
lenged regulation.”84  Second, the Court has expressed caution of the view 
that property rights within the takings context “should be coextensive with 
those rights under state law.”85  Due to these considerations, the Court noted 
that no single test can determine the denominator in a takings inquiry.86  In-
stead, the Court introduced new factors that lower courts must consider in 
order to identify whether reasonable expectations would lead a landowner 
                                                          
 76.  Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942–50 (2017). 
 77.  Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497 (citing Michelman, supra note 68, at 1192). 
 78.  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943–44. 
 79.  Id. at 1945; see infra notes 88–95 and accompanying text. 
 80.  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1948–50. 
 81.  U.S. CONST. amend. V; Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1943. 
 82.  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1942–43. 
 83.  Id. at 1944–45. 
 84.  Id. at 1944; see supra Part II.B. 
 85.  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1944–45. 
 86.  Id. at 1945. 
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to anticipate that their land “would be treated as one parcel, or instead, as 
separate tracts,” based on background customs and legal tradition.87 
The first factor directs courts to “give substantial weight to the treat-
ment of the land, in particular how it is bounded or divided, under state and 
local law.”88  The Court explained that a restriction that predates ownership 
can be an objective factor that a landowner would consider in forming their 
fair expectation of the property, but that a valid takings claim does not dis-
appear “because a purchaser took title after the law was enacted.”89 
The second factor instructs courts to consider the physical characteris-
tics of the property, including (1) the relationship of any distinguishable 
tracts, (2) the parcel’s topography, and (3) the surrounding human and eco-
logical environment.90  The Court also suggested that it might be particular-
ly relevant that the property is “in an area that is subject to, or likely to be-
come subject to, environmental or other regulation.”91 
The third factor tells courts to “assess the value of the property under 
the challenged regulation,” with particular attention given to the effect of 
the encumbered land on the value of other assets.92  The Court offered ex-
amples in which a use restriction may decrease the market value of one 
holding, but effectively add value to the remaining property, such as by in-
creasing privacy, expanding recreation space, allowing expansion of an ex-
isting structure, or by preserving natural beauty.93  In these situations, a 
court may be inclined to treat the land as a single parcel.94  On the other 
hand, the Court noted that the absence of a special relationship between the 
holdings may lean in favor of treating the land as distinct parcels.95 
Under the new multifactor standard, the Supreme Court held that the 
Murrs’ lots should be evaluated as a single parcel.96  First, state and local 
law—namely the merger provision—defined Lot E and Lot F as one unit 
                                                          
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. (first citing Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U.S. 241, 262 (1907); and then citing Palazzolo v. 
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001)).  Similarly, “a use restriction which is triggered only af-
ter, or because of, a change in ownership should also guide a court’s assessment of reasonable pri-
vate expectations.”  Id.  For example, in this case, the Murrs’ “land was subject to [the merger 
provision] . . . only because of voluntary conduct in bringing the lots under common ownership 
after the regulations were enacted,” thus the “law inform[ed] the reasonable expectation they will 
be treated as a single property.”  Id. at 1948. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 1945–46 (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring). 
 92.  Id. at 1946. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. at 1948. 
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when they came under common ownership in 1995.97  Further, the Murrs’ 
“land was subject to [the merger provision] . . . only because of voluntary 
conduct in bringing the lots under common ownership after the regulations 
were enacted,” thus the “law informs the reasonable expectation they will 
be treated as a single property.”98  Second, the physical properties of the 
land support the conclusion that the holdings are a unified parcel.99  “The 
lots are contiguous along their longest edge,” individually they have limited 
uses due to their rough terrain, and their location on the St. Croix River 
makes it likely that public regulation might affect enjoyment of the proper-
ty.100  “Third, the prospective value that Lot E brings to Lot F supports” 
unifying the parcels for the purpose of a takings analysis.101  Despite losing 
the opportunity to sell Lot E and build a separate structure on Lot F, the 
Murrs gained the possibility of using the property as an “integrated 
whole.”102  Using the property as a whole would give the Murrs elevated 
privacy, increased recreational space, and room for additions or improve-
ments to the cabin on Lot F.103  The Court further pointed out that, if the 
lots were sold separately, Lot E and Lot F would be worth $40,000 and 
$373,000 respectively, while they are worth $698,300 combined.104  Con-
sidering the property as a whole, the Court concluded that the Murrs did not 
suffer a taking under the Lucas105 and Penn Central106 tests.107 
The Court also addressed the Murrs’ and Wisconsin’s suggestions to 
adopt formalistic rules to guide the denominator inquiry.108  Wisconsin 
asked the Court to “tie the definition of the parcel to state law.”109  Howev-
er, the Court took issue with this approach because, in essence, a state may 
be able to define a relevant parcel in a way that permits it to escape any tak-
ings claim.110  The Court also noted that state law is part of the new test’s 
                                                          
 97.  Id. (citing Murr II, No. 2013AP2828, 2014 WL 7271581, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 
2014)); see supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 98.  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1948. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id. at 1948–49. 
 104.  Id. at 1949. 
 105.  See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text. 
 106.  See supra Part II.B. 
 107.  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1949–50. 
 108.  Id. at 1946–48. 
 109.  Id. at 1946. 
 110.  Id. at 1945–47.  The Court stated: 
[A] State might enact a law that consolidates nonadjacent property owned by a single 
person . . . then impose[] development limits on the aggregate set.  If a court defined the 
parcel according to the state law requiring consolidation, this improperly would fortify 
the state law against a takings claim, because the court would look to the retained value 
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third factor, which directs courts to look to state law to identify reasonable 
expectations regarding regulation.111 
The Murrs, on the other hand, proposed that the Court adopt a test in 
which “lot lines define the relevant parcel.”112  However, the Court disre-
garded this argument because “lot lines are themselves creatures of state 
law,” and thus, the Murrs effectively asked the Court to accept one form of 
state law that induces their preferred result—lot lines—but ignore another 
that does not—the merger provision.113  The Court reasoned that, because 
the merger provision is a legitimate exercise of governmental power, rely-
ing on lot lines to define the parcel would frustrate states’ ability to imple-
ment minimum lot size provisions and “cast[] doubt on the many merger 
provisions that exist nationwide today.”114  Finally, the Court reasoned that 
lot-line provisions are not consistent across the country, and thus, it would 
be “difficult to make them a standard measure of the reasonable expecta-
tions of property owners.”115 
In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Thomas and 
Alito, agreed that the Murrs’ property should be treated as a whole, but be-
lieved that the Court erred by defining “private property” under a new 
“elaborate [factorial] test.”116  Chief Justice Roberts instead suggested de-
fining the property at issue based on state law “in all but the most excep-
tional circumstances.”117  Responding to the majority’s concern that proper-
ty owners may “strategically pluck one strand from their bundle of property 
rights” to claim a taking on that strand alone, Chief Justice Roberts argued 
that “unbundling” is not a problem “when a legally distinct parcel is the ba-
sis” for a takings claim.118 
Next, Chief Justice Roberts rebutted the majority’s contention that a 
state-law rule invites “gamesmanship” in which owners may seek to alter 
lot lines in anticipation of regulation, and states may pass laws to consoli-
date property and avoid takings claims.119  He argued that strategic splitting 
                                                          
in the property as a whole rather than considering whether individual holdings had lost 
all value. 
Id. at 1945.  However, see Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent, in which he argues that the Court should 
adopt this simple test.  Id. at 1950–57 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see infra text accompanying 
notes 116–131. 
 111.  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1946–47 (majority opinion). 
 112.  Id. at 1947. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 1947–48 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae National Ass’n of Counties et al. at 12–31, 
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017) (No 15-214)). 
 115.  Id. at 1948. 
 116.  Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 117.  Id. at 1953. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
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is “not particularly difficult to detect and disarm,”120 such as in Penn Cen-
tral when the Court prevented an owner’s attempt to separate their air rights 
from other property rights.121 
Chief Justice Roberts next contended that the Court muddled the tak-
ings analysis by failing to separate step one—defining “private property”—
from step two—determining whether that property has been taken for pub-
lic use.122  He argued that the effects of an ordinance and the extent of prop-
erty owners’ expectations are issues that should not be “[c]ramm[ed]” into 
the definition of private property.123  Chief Justice Roberts contended that, 
in departing from state property principles, the Court has created a “litiga-
tion-specific definition of ‘property’”124  Effectively, Chief Justice Roberts 
maintained, the government’s regulatory interests will now be assessed 
twice in takings analyses: once in “identifying the relevant parcel,” and 
again in determining if the regulation has placed too high a burden on that 
parcel.125  That is, property will be defined based in part on the considera-
tion of community interests versus individual rights—allowing the govern-
ment’s goals to shape the inquiry before the takings analysis even begins.126  
Or as Chief Justice Roberts put it, “The result is clear double counting . . . : 
Reasonable government regulation should have been anticipated by the 
landowner, so the relevant parcel is defined consistent with that regulation,” 
therefore “the regulation will seem eminently reasonable given its impact 
on the pre-packaged parcel.”127  Chief Justice Roberts summed up his dis-
content with a simple public policy argument: the muddled factor test re-
moves a stable state-law test and compromises the Takings Clause as a pro-
tection of private property from overbearing public interests.128 
Chief Justice Roberts concluded his dissent by applying the state-law 
test to the Murrs’ property.129  In his eyes, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
erred in applying a takings-specific approach to defining the parcel instead 
of inquiring whether the lots were separate under Wisconsin law.130  Chief 
Justice Roberts suggested vacating the judgment below and remanding to 
                                                          
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id.; see supra Part II.B. 
 122.  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1951, 1954. 
 123.  Id. at 1954. 
 124.  Id. at 1954–55.  The Penn Central Court explicitly refused to create a litigation-specific 
definition of property.  See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 149 n.13 
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court must define the particular property unit that 
should be examined. . . . The Court does little to resolve these questions . . . .”). 
 125.  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1955. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 1955–56. 
 128.  Id. at 1956. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id. 
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the state court to identify the relevant parcel under Wisconsin property 
law.131 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Murr v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner’s 
property should be analyzed under a new factorial test to determine whether 
two contiguous lots should be treated as one for the purpose of a regulatory 
takings analysis.132  In doing so, the Court further muddled the per se and ad 
hoc inquiries of regulatory takings analyses.  First, the Court provided sub-
jective factors that fail to clarify the few categorical rules available under 
the takings doctrine and essentially render Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council claims of total economic deprivation no longer per se takings.133  
Second, the Court allowed for review in ad hoc inquiries that considers state 
interests twice, providing for gamesmanship by state legislatures.134  Third, 
the Court created hollow factors that hamper predictability and do not solve 
the denominator problem, yet may mislead litigants to embark on an unsuc-
cessful litigation strategy.135 
The issues with Murr stem from long-standing problems with regula-
tory takings jurisprudence.136  It would be unreasonable to claim that Murr 
could have completely overhauled the regulatory takings doctrine.  Howev-
er, Murr did provide an opportunity to take a step toward clarifying the reg-
ulatory takings doctrine by demystifying the denominator problem.  Based 
                                                          
 131.  Id.  Justice Thomas also wrote a dissenting opinion, in which he argued that the Court 
should have taken the opportunity “to take a fresh look at . . . takings jurisprudence, to see wheth-
er it can be grounded in the original public meaning of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.”  Id. at 1957–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 132.  Id. at 1942–50 (majority opinion). 
 133.  See infra Part IV.A.1 for a discussion about whether Lucas claims were “per se” to begin 
with. 
 134.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 135.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 136.  See, e.g., Buhmann v. State, 201 P.3d 70, 109 n.4 (Mont. 2008) (Nelson, J., dissenting) 
(“Federal regulatory takings jurisprudence has been described as a ‘doctrinal muddle’ lacking 
‘theoretical coherence,’‘a confused body of law containing contradictory principles and stand-
ards,’ a composite of ‘ad hoc determinations rather than principled resolutions,’ and an area of law 
whose ‘predominant characteristic’ is ‘a welter of confusing and apparently incompatible results.’  
It has been said that ‘[e]ven the wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainty 
about the scope of [the Supreme Court’s] takings jurisprudence.’  The Supreme Court itself has 
acknowledged that its regulatory takings jurisprudence ‘cannot be characterized as unified.’” (al-
teration in original) (citations omitted) (first citing Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Re-
visited: Phantom Incorporation and the Roots of the Takings “Muddle”, 90 MINN. L. REV. 826, 
827–28 (2006); then citing John D. Echeverria & Sharon Dennis, The Takings Issue and the Due 
Process Clause: A Way Out of a Doctrinal Confusion, 17 VT. L. REV. 695, 696 (1993); then citing 
Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 561, 562 (1984); then citing Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 
37 (1964); and then citing Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 866 (1987) (Stevens & 
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting))). 
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on the discussion below, it seems that the Court did not substantially em-
brace this opportunity. 
A.  The Murr Analysis Hollows out Already Questionable Categorical 
Takings Jurisprudence and Systematically Defers to the State in Ad 
Hoc Inquiries 
Section A.1 addresses the issues with Lucas’s categorical, economic 
deprivation rule, and Murr’s effect on that rule going forward.137  Sec-
tion A.2 explores the application of the Murr test to non-categorical tak-
ings—an analysis that relies on state interests twice.138 
1.  The Lucas Framework Was Never Really a “Categorical” Rule 
Lucas purports to create a categorical rule so that a taking occurs 
whenever a regulation deprives a landowner of all economically viable use 
of their property.  Even with the decision in Murr, the Court has failed to 
provide a workable standard for determining the appropriate denominator 
for the Lucas inquiry.139 
From the outset, the Lucas Court was aware of how blurry its new 
“bright-line”140 rule was: 
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our “deprivation of all eco-
nomically feasible use” rule is greater than its precision, since the 
rule does not make clear the “property interest” against which the 
loss of value is to be measured.  When, for example, a regulation 
requires a developer to leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural 
state, it is unclear whether we would analyze the situation as one 
in which the owner has been deprived of all economically benefi-
cial use of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which 
the owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract as a 
whole.141 
Not only is Lucas internally incomplete, but also, Lucas compounded 
confusion over the denominator problem by neglecting to explain or over-
turn inconsistent prior cases.142  For example, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, the Court determined that, because sub-surface property interests 
are separate from surface property interests and the statute143 at issue “pur-
                                                          
 137.  See infra Part IV.A.1.  In Part II, this Note described another categorical rule—Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.’s physical occupation taking—but the analysis that follows 
will focus on Lucas and not on Loretto.  See supra Part II.A. 
 138.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 139.  Lynn E. Blais, The Total Takings Myth, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 47, 65 (2017). 
 140.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1067 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 141.  Id. at 1016 n.7 (majority opinion). 
 142.  Blais, supra note 139, at 63. 
 143.  The Mahon Court described the statute as follows:  
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port[ed] to abolish” the entire sub-surface property interest, a compensable 
taking had occurred.144  Yet, sixty-five years later the Court held in Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis145 that a nearly identical 
law146 did not constitute a taking—all this without overruling Mahon.147  In 
other words, despite nearly identical facts, the Court determined that in Ma-
hon a taking occurred because a distinct bundle of property rights was tak-
en, yet later held in Keystone that the property as a whole must be taken in 
order to establish a taking.  The Lucas Court acknowledged this incon-
sistency, but chose not to address it, thus further confusing the denominator 
issue and undermining its new, so-called “categorical” rule.148 
Despite the Court’s insistence that the Lucas total takings rule should 
apply very rarely,149 it is raised in a large number of regulatory takings cas-
es.150  Yet, in spite of its frequent invocation, the success rate is shockingly 
low at 1.6%.151  Lower courts have found a Lucas taking in only four in-
                                                          
  The statute forbids the mining of anthracite coal in such way as to cause the subsid-
ence of, among other things, any structure used as a human habitation, with certain ex-
ceptions, including among them land where the surface is owned by the owner of the 
underlying coal and is distant more than one hundred and fifty feet from any improved 
property belonging to any other person. 
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413–14 (1922). 
 144.  Id. at 414. 
 145.  480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
 146.  The Keystone Court described the statute as follows: 
Section 4 of the Subsidence Act prohibits mining that causes subsidence damage to 
three categories of structures that were in place on April 17, 1966: public buildings and 
noncommercial buildings generally used by the public; dwellings used for human habi-
tation; and cemeteries.  Since 1966 the [regulatory agency] has . . . generally require[d] 
50% of the coal beneath structures protected by § 4 to be kept in place as a means of 
providing surface support.  Section 6 of the Subsidence Act authorizes the DER to re-
voke a mining permit if the removal of coal causes damage to a structure or area pro-
tected by § 4 . . . . 
Id. at 476–77 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (citing Subsidence Act, 52 PA. CONST. STAT. 
§ 1406.4 (1986)). 
 147.  Id. at 496. 
 148.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1016 n.7 (1992) (comparing Mahon 
with Keystone and stating that “this uncertainty regarding the composition of the denominator in 
our ‘deprivation’ fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court”) (first citing 
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414; then citing Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497–502); see Blais, supra note 139, at 
63 (noting the inconsistencies between Mahon and Keystone). 
 149.  Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018; see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan-
ning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002) (“[O]ur holding was limited to ‘the extraordinary circum-
stance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.’” (quoting Lucas, 
505 U.S. at 1017)).   
 150.  See Carol Necole Brown & Dwight H. Merriam, On the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Lu-
cas: Making or Breaking the Takings Claim, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1849–50 (2017) (reviewing 
over 1,700 Lucas cases in state and federal courts over the past twenty-five years). 
 151.  Id. (finding only 27 successful Lucas claims out of a total of approximately 1,700 cases). 
 2018] MURR V. WISCONSIN 89 
stances: nuisance abatement cases,152 private agreement cases,153 specific 
zoning cases,154 and extreme delay of development cases.155  These cases 
point to the heart of the issue: the doctrine’s ambiguity—it is only success-
ful in a small number of cases, yet is ambiguous enough to lead litigants to 
believe they may have a successful claim in a large number of cases. 
It is no secret that Lucas has undergone its fair share of criticism.156  
One commentator attacked the “theoretical gap” underlying Lucas—a frac-
tion without a way to determine the denominator—by describing it as a 
“conceptual black hole.”157  To many, this legal gap is what made Murr 
such an attractive case: it gave the Court a chance to clear up the denomina-
tor problem and give real power to the “total takings” doctrine.158  Professor 
Lynn E. Blais took that thought even further, believing that Murr should 
have overturned Lucas because total takings are a “myth” and “bright-line 
rules have no place in regulatory takings doctrine.”159 
2.  State Law Is a More Straightforward and Established Standard 
for Defining the Relevant Parcel 
In Murr, the Court did not do anything as drastic as overturn Lucas, 
but instead attempted to define a parcel of land through three subjective fac-
                                                          
 152.  See id. at 1863–66 (discussing four successful Lucas cases where “courts perceive that 
the statutory nuisance defenses are weak or unsupported, sometimes because they are inconsistent 
with common-law nuisance principles”). 
 153.  See id. at 1866–75 (discussing successful Lucas cases where private agreements, such as 
restrictive covenants, lease agreements, and development plans, reduced the property owner’s de-
nominator). 
 154.  See id. at 1875–84 (discussing successful Lucas cases where the property was zoned in 
the least inclusive zoning classification and the government denied the owner’s requests for de-
velopment of some other land use). 
 155.  See id. at 1884–87 (discussing successful Lucas cases where extreme delay occurred in 
the building permit process). 
 156.  See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expecta-
tions, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1369, 1370 (1993) (describing the Lucas opinion as “rickety” and 
“anticlimactic”); William W. Fisher III, The Trouble with Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1395 
(1993) (criticizing Justice Scalia’s “cavalier use of constitutional principles” in the Lucas deci-
sion).  But see, e.g., John J. Delaney, Advancing Private Property Rights: The Lessons of Lucas, 
22 STETSON L. REV. 395 (1993) (describing the positive impact of Lucas). 
 157.  Blais, supra note 139, at 65 (quoting John E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative 
Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1032 (2003)). 
 158.  See, e.g., Gavin S. Frisch, Note, What Is the Relevant Parcel? Clarifying the “Parcel as a 
Whole” Standard in Murr v. Wisconsin, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 253, 267 
(2017), 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1157&context=djclpp_sidebar (quot-
ing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (“Murr v. Wisconsin provides the 
Court a crucial opportunity to clarify the rule for determining the ‘parcel as a whole.’”). 
 159.  Blais, supra note 139, at 85, 88.  Still, Blais argues, there will be plenty of opportunity to 
overturn Lucas.  Id. at 88 (“The Court’s recent decision in Murr is certain to generate a flood of 
Lucas total takings litigation, so the Court will have ample opportunity in the near future to . . . 
overturn Lucas.”). 
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tors.160  The identification of a parcel would be easier to come by if the 
Court stopped after the first factor: deference to the state’s treatment of the 
land under local law.161  Under the new framework for takings analyses, a 
court must ask “whether reasonable expectations about property ownership 
would lead a landowner to anticipate that his holdings would be treated as 
one parcel, or, instead, as separate tracts.”162  As Chief Justice Roberts ar-
gued in his dissent, if the inquiry ended there, the denominator would be 
clearly defined by state law.163  Thus, because the Murrs’ properties were 
merged into one tract under a local ordinance, the takings inquiry would 
have treated the lots as one.164  But as Justice Kennedy pointed out, there 
are significant issues with this inquiry.165 
Primarily, states may be able to define the relevant parcel in a way that 
allows them to escape responsibility for regulatory takings.166  In other 
words, if the numerator is the loss of value attributable to the regulation and 
the denominator is the relevant parcel for which the impact should be 
judged, the state will always define the denominator as broadly as possible 
to prevent the numerator from equaling the denominator, which would rep-
resent a total taking.167  Thus, a state would be able to define a parcel in a 
manner that leaves available some economically viable use, thereby deny-
ing a compensable Lucas taking.  In this situation, a landowner would have 
to “roll the dice under the Penn Central balancing” factors to argue that, 
although not a total economic deprivation, a regulatory taking has oc-
curred.168 
Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissent, properly disarmed the majority’s 
worry over “gamesmanship.”169  Both landowners seeking to alter lot lines 
in anticipation of regulation, on the one hand, and a state passing laws to 
consolidate property and avoid a takings claim, on the other, are somewhat 
                                                          
 160.  See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017) (providing three new factors, but 
refusing to overturn any prior takings jurisprudence). 
 161.  See id. (providing two additional factors to consider beyond the treatment under local 
law). 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 164.  Id. at 1948 (majority opinion). 
 165.  See infra notes 166–168 and accompanying text. 
 166.  Id. at 1946. 
 167.  See Danaya C. Wright, A New Time for Denominators: Toward a Dynamic Theory of 
Property in the Regulatory Takings Relevant Parcel Analysis, 34 ENVTL. L. 175, 188 (2004) 
(“[W]hen the numerator is a small toothpick and the denominator is the entire bundle, the likeli-
hood of the Court requiring compensation is small.  Where the numerator is a large portion of the 
bundle, or cuts across every stick in the bundle, the likelihood of compensation increases until it 
becomes mandatory if certain core sticks or the entire bundle is taken.”).  Alternatively, a property 
owner wants to define the denominator as narrowly as possible.  See id. 
 168.  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1955 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 169.  Id. at 1953. 
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easy to “detect and disarm.”170  For example, in Penn Central, the Court re-
jected a strategic splitting of property rights where the property owners at-
tempted to focus the takings analysis on air rights as distinct from other 
property rights.171  Further, the nature of the Takings Clause and prior Su-
preme Court jurisprudence will always balance the interests of the individu-
al’s private property rights172 and the government’s power to adjust rights 
for the public good.173  Any impermissible posturing on either side of a tak-
ings litigation will certainly be snuffed out by courts and existing state 
property law in the interest of this balance.174 
Wisconsin, for example, has strict, formal procedures that must be fol-
lowed in order for an owner to alter lot lines.175  Wisconsin requires a certi-
fied survey map to change boundaries, and even then, the new survey is not 
permissible “if the reconfiguration does not result in a subdivision or violate 
a local ordinance or resolution.”176  These strict formulations make it ex-
tremely difficult for a property owner to alter lot lines in anticipation of 
regulation. 
To be sure, little guidance exists on how courts would “detect and dis-
arm” such gamesmanship by either side.177  One solution would advise 
courts to use the second and third factors under Murr—physical characteris-
tics and encumbered property value—to snuff out any impermissible pos-
turing.178  In this scenario, the denominator would be easily identified under 
state law and then courts would apply the remaining Murr factors if the case 
at hand stunk of impermissible gamesmanship.  Having defined the relevant 
                                                          
 170.  Id. 
 171.  See generally Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); cf. Phillips 
v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 167 (1998) (first citing Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. 
v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 163–64 (1980); and then citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)) (“[A] State may not sidestep the Takings Clause by disavowing tradition-
al property interests long recognized under state law.”). 
 172.  See supra note 65. 
 173.  See supra note 66. 
 174.  Some courts and commentators have noted that protections from impermissible posturing 
would be snuffed out by combination of the takings doctrine and the substantive due process 
test—two frameworks that “seem analytically identical.”  See Orion Corp. v. State, 747 P.2d 1062, 
1076 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (first citing William B. Stoebuck, San Diego Gas: Problems, Pitfalls 
and a Better Way, 25 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 20 (1983): and then citing Ross A. Macfarlane, 
Comment, Testing the Constitutional Validity of Land Use Regulations: Substantive Due Process 
as a Superior Alternative to Takings Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV. 715, 729 (1982)); see also Ste-
ven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal, 51 ALA. L. REV. 
977, 980 (2000) (arguing for greater property rights by overlapping substantive due process with 
takings protections). 
 175.  See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 236.34 (West 2015) (providing strict guidelines for changing lot 
lines). 
 176.  Id. § 236.34(1)(4)(bm). 
 177.  Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1953 (2017) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 178.  Id. at 1945–46 (majority opinion); supra text accompanying notes 90–95. 
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parcel, the court would be free to analyze the property under Lucas, Loretto, 
and Penn Central. 
Consider this hypothetical: A developer purchases two contiguous 
lots—Lot A and Lot B—abutting a landfill that the developer also owns.  
Lot A, the lot closest to the landfill, is rendered economically useless pur-
suant to a recently enacted environmental regulation that essentially forbids 
expansion of the landfill.  Lot A is surrounded on three sides by the landfill 
with the fourth side abutting Lot B.  Lot B is surrounded by a beautiful and 
popular beach on three sides.  Under local law, Lot A could be merged with 
Lot B. 
State law has defined clearly the lots’ lines through its merger provi-
sion, but the developer believes that it can establish a taking of Lot A be-
cause it wants to expand the landfill onto that lot.  Under the second and 
third Murr factors, a court would look to the physical characteristics and the 
value of the property under the new regulation to determine if the state de-
fined lot lines to avoid a takings claim. 
First, Lot A is surrounded by the landfill, yet Lot B is beautiful and a 
perfect spot to build an apartment building.  The physical characteristics of 
the lots show that each has its own individual uses.  However, the lots’ lo-
cation near a landfill and a beach make it likely that public regulation might 
affect enjoyment of the property.179 
Second, Lot A does not likely bring any prospective value to Lot B.  In 
fact, it is likely that the landfill will lower the value of Lot B.  The develop-
er is losing the opportunity to build the only thing feasible on Lot A (a land-
fill), but not gaining any use of the property as an integrated whole.  Unlike 
Murr, the developer gains no more privacy, recreational space, nor room for 
improvements under the merger provision.180  A court would balance these 
two factors to determine if any impermissible posturing occurred.181 
*** 
Instead of clearing up the denominator problem, Murr’s subjective fac-
tors will increase instances of litigations that invoke what was supposed to 
be the rarely used Lucas framework.182  Now, plaintiffs can attempt to use 
these subjective factors to narrowly define their property and claim that a 
regulation has taken all economic use of that narrowly defined property.183  
As discussed above, these cases will generally fail.184  In short, the Murr 
                                                          
 179.  Much like the location of the lots on the St. Croix River in Murr.  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 
1948. 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  In this hypothetical it seems more likely that a court would find posturing than in a situa-
tion like Murr, but it is clear that a landowner must climb a high hurdle to win.  There is no doubt 
separation of powers and deference to the legislature would also play significant factors. 
 182.  See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 183.  See supra note 150 and accompanying text. 
 184.  See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
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factors have further attenuated property owners from successful takings 
claims under the misguided Lucas “per se” test. 
Further, the vague and subjective factors set out in Murr poke major 
holes in “categorical” takings jurisprudence, showing that bright-line rules 
really are a “myth” in the infinitely subjective takings inquiry.185  In re-
sponse to the uncertainty revolving around Lucas, and now Murr, commen-
tators have offered compelling evidence that overturning Lucas would be a 
good first step in resolving problems with takings jurisprudence, however, 
it is beyond the scope of this Note to analyze those predictive assertions.186 
3.  The Court Impermissibly Relied on a Double-Reasonableness 
Test That Gives Too Much Deference to the State 
Instead of stopping at the state law factor, the Murr Court explained 
that in applying the new test, a court should also focus on “[t]he reasonable 
expectations of an acquirer of land,” whether “the property is located in an 
area that is subject to, or likely to become subject to, environmental or other 
regulation,” and whether the regulation of one portion of property benefits 
or harms the value of another portion.187  Thus, before even applying the 
Penn Central factors, a court would define the relevant property using fac-
tors that incorporate familiar aspects of the Penn Central test, such as dimi-
nution of the property and the reasonable expectations of the property own-
er.188 
Put another way, there are two questions a court must answer under 
the current takings jurisprudence: (1) what is the relevant property affected 
                                                          
 185.  See Blais, supra note 139, at 88 (arguing that there is no such thing as a categorical rule 
in regulatory takings doctrine).  Professor Blais argued:  
[T]he Court’s attempt to create a total takings doctrine has failed, and . . . the Court 
should repudiate it.  It demonstrates that the Court’s initial total takings opinions were 
conceptually incoherent and woefully undertheorized.  And . . . attempts by lower 
courts to rehabilitate the doctrine by crystallizing the bright-line rules through careful 
and consistent application were doomed to, and did, fail. . . . Although bright-line rules 
have their place, it is not in the heart of regulatory takings doctrine, which is premised 
on concerns for fairness and justice in distributing the burdens of land use regulation. 
Id. at 47–48. 
 186.  See id. (suggesting that the Court should overturn Lucas); John D. Echeverria, Antonin 
Scalia’s Flawed Takings Legacy, 41 VT. L. REV. 689, 716 (2017) (“The Lucas decision remains a 
governing Supreme Court precedent, but the test’s numerous qualifications and limitations make 
its future viability uncertain.”); John D. Echeverria, Time to Overturn Lucas, NAT’L L.J. (Nov. 14, 
2005), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/900005440881/time-to-overturn-
lucas/?back=law. 
 187.  Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945–46 (2017) (first citing Ballard v. Hunter, 204 
U.S. 241, 262 (1907); and then citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1035 (1992) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 188.  See id. at 1955 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The result is that the government’s goals 
shape the playing field before the contest over whether the challenged regulation goes ‘too far’ 
even gets underway.”); Blais, supra note 139, at 65 (noting that the Murr factors incorporate parts 
of the Penn Central test). 
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by the regulation; and (2) does the regulation vacuum out all economic val-
ue in the relevant property?189  Under the new Murr factors, the Court is 
prescribing lower courts to look into the merits of the takings claim, which 
should be done in step two, to define the property in step one, thus the regu-
lation will seemingly always be reasonable; a court does not reach the ad 
hoc Penn Central test until it has determined that the regulation did not de-
ny all productive use of the parcel.190  This leaves a court to consider the 
state’s interests twice: once in identifying the parcel, and again in determin-
ing if “the regulation has placed too” high a burden on that parcel.191  Not 
only is a court predetermining the reasonableness of the regulation, but it is 
also predetermining the basic question of whether or not there was a taking. 
This double counting presents a major problem in takings inquiries be-
cause the government’s goals shape the outcome of the takings analysis be-
fore it even begins.  Lucas and Penn Central each require that the relevant 
property has already been defined.192  The Supreme Court has never relied 
on anything other than state property principles to define property.193  Un-
der Murr, courts will now rely on the reasonableness of the regulation as 
applied to the landowner when determining what constitutes the relevant 
property.194  Thus, the Court has authorized exactly what it refused to do in 
Penn Central: create a litigation-specific definition of “property.”195  Be-
cause takings cases necessarily pit the interests of the few against the great-
er good, giving too much deference to the state further isolates the suffering 
of the minority.196  The Fifth Amendment was created to do just the oppo-
site—protect the citizen from the encumbrances of the government.197 
                                                          
 189.  Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1955. 
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B.  Confusion and Unpredictability Are Sure to Follow the Subjective 
Murr Test 
The practical issues with the Murr holding will derive from the confu-
sion that the Murr test adds to an already murky doctrine.  Ultimately, Murr 
decided a very specific type of takings case: one where two contiguous and 
commonly owned parcels of land face merger.198  This was a prime case for 
the Supreme Court to try to clarify the denominator problem because, here, 
it was as clear as possible that the outcome of the takings analysis depended 
on what the court determined the denominator to be.  Under one theory, Lot 
E would be the denominator, and all of Lot E was taken from the Murrs, so 
the St. Croix regulation would constitute a taking.199  Under another, Lot E 
and Lot F would be treated together as the denominator, and thus, taking 
Lot E would not constitute a taking of all economic benefit from the proper-
ty.200 
Under the guise of solving the denominator problem, the Court mud-
dled the takings doctrine by providing a subjective firewall that is outcome 
determinant.  The majority admits that “[d]efining the property at the out-
set . . . should not necessarily preordain the outcome in every case.”201  But 
the factors the Court created do just that.  By objectively analyzing “the 
treatment of the land under state and local law; the physical characteristics 
of the land; and the prospective value of the regulated land” to define the 
property,202 the Court has allowed lower courts to determine the outcome of 
the case before even getting to the takings inquiry.203  Because the factors 
generally give deference to the state, it is likely that the outcomes will in-
creasingly be a win for the state. 
The Murr test will no doubt lead courts to inconsistent and unpredicta-
ble outcomes.204  When creating its new test, the Court provided lists of 
possible inquiries under each factor,205 but noted that these lists are not ex-
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haustive.206  Effectively, the Court has provided the state a fail-safe with 
endless litigation strategies and factors to pull from.207  The Court is clear to 
emphasize that “the reasonable expectations at issue derive from back-
ground customs and the whole of our legal tradition.”208  Thus, the Court 
has provided endless ways of defining the three factors, against the back-
drop of “reasonable” legal traditions, which are driven by government.209 
As such, Murr is a big win for governments and a big loss for real 
property owners—especially those with adjacent lots—for two reasons.  
First, when a government decides to redefine the boundaries of, or restrict 
the use of, private property, a property owner must now wade through six 
judicially created factors (three from Murr and three from Penn Central) to 
figure out if compensation is due.210  It is unlikely that a layperson could in-
dividually analyze their case under these factors, resulting in ambiguity and 
increased legal fees to the property owner.  In contrast, if the Court had 
adopted a model using state law to define the property subject to a taking 
analysis, the average landowner would simply refer to state law to begin as-
sessing their takings claim, thus compelling less ambiguity and less legal 
fees.  Second, a clever legislature can craft regulations that will affect prop-
erty rights without requiring just compensation.211  The subjective factors 
are also good news for property lawyers and legal scholars—the uncertainty 
of Murr will undoubtedly produce substantial litigation and literature.212 
Consider, for example, the environmental regulation at issue in Murr.  
Under the regulation’s “Substandard Lots” provision, an owner may only 
build on a substandard lot if (1) it “is in separate ownership from abutting 
lands”; or (2) “by itself or in combination with an adjacent lot” in common 
ownership, it has at least one acre of developable land (otherwise called 
“net project area”).213  If Lot A is 0.5 acres and Lot B is 0.49 acres, and the 
lots are contiguous, they are individually substandard lots.  If X owns Lot A 
and Y owns Lot B, then each owner would be able to build on their sub-
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standard lot.  But if X owns both Lot A and Lot B, then at 0.99 acres, X may 
not build on each lot separately.  This seemingly absurd result is exactly 
what occurred in Murr.214 
States remedy this absurd result by way of merger, where lots are 
treated as one.215  Thus, under a merger provision, X would be able to build 
on Lots A and B as if they were one substandard lot.  Merger provisions are 
useful because they are “designed to strike a balance between a municipali-
ty’s interest in abolishing nonconformities and the interests of property 
owners in maintaining land uses that were allowed when they purchased 
their property.”216  Moreover, merger provisions are commonplace across 
the country and have been so for nearly a century.217 
Where merger provisions are at play, litigants must target those provi-
sions before getting to the substance of their takings claims.  Previously, 
this would have been the litigant’s only hurdle in a takings case.  But in-
stead of leaving the state regulation to its own volition, the Murr Court add-
ed more factors that further defer to the state in defining the denominator.  
The added confusion and deferential undertones of the new subjective fac-
tors work against the litigant.218 
Interestingly, only two months after the Murr decision, the Wisconsin 
state legislature introduced a bill that “limit[s] the authority of local gov-
ernments to regulate development on substandard lots and require the merg-
ing of lots.”219  On November 27, 2017, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker 
signed the bill into law.220  In a clear reaction to Murr, the legislature ex-
panded property rights by allowing owners to sell and build on substandard 
lots if such activity was legal when the lot was created.221  Additionally, the 
“bill prohibits a [municipality] from requiring that one or more lots be 
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merged with another lot without the consent of the owners of the lots that 
are to be merged.”222  Supporters of the bill are calling it the “homeowners’ 
bill of rights.”223  It would not be surprising to see similar bills pop up 
across the country.224 
Ultimately, Murr did not change the functionality of regulatory takings 
jurisprudence.  As it was previously, it will still be very difficult for proper-
ty owners to win these cases.225  However, the legal field could see a de-
crease in commonly owned contiguous lots.  A sophisticated property own-
er will research local regulation and merger laws before purchasing 
contiguous lots to avoid the risk of losing serious value when a regulation 
takes away the use of one of their lots.  Murr stands for the chipping away 
of private property rights by creating further obstacles for just compensa-
tion under the Fifth Amendment. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Murr v. Wisconsin, the Court had the opportunity to solve the de-
nominator problem,226 but instead, failed to clarify the few categorical rules 
available under the takings doctrine including the seldom-successful Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council total takings test.227  Further, the Court 
gave too much deference to the state by requiring double counting of state 
interests and regulation reasonableness.228  Finally, the Court created confu-
sion through narrow factors that ultimately will be meaningless in most tak-
ings inquiries, yet may mislead litigants to embark on an unsuccessful liti-
gation strategy.229  Going forward, states will have freer range to enact 
regulations that affect property interests and upset property owners’ access 
to relief under the current regulatory takings scheme.230 
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